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Uncertain Land Availability and Perceived Biases in Investment Decisions: The 




Uncertainty about the possibility of acquiring land can be rather large in the 
EU for sectors like dairy farming. Farm-level investment decisions are commonly 
made ex-ante when the farmer is not certain about the possibility of purchasing land. 
This possibility is realized only in a future period. In this paper, we have developed 
and applied a simple two-period model in which a profit-maximizing farmer, facing 
uncertainty about the possibility of acquiring land, had to choose the optimal mix of 
capital (buildings) investment and land endowment. We have shown that commonly 
"observed" biases towards non-optimal investment decisions are not necessarily 
justified. Rather, these perceived biases may be the result of evaluating investment 
decisions without reference to the uncertainty associated with the possibility of 
acquiring land.  
 





Empirical observations suggest that capital rewards in agriculture are often 
non-optimal (Gardner, 1992). The fixed asset theory (Johnson and Passour, 1981) 
explains this by stating that farmers invest when the shadow price of capital exceeds 
the buying price of capital (acquisition costs) and disinvest when the shadow price of 
capital is lower than the selling price (salvage value). Because the selling price is 
lower than the buying price farmers accept factor rewards for capital between the 
buying and selling prices. Related to this theory is the observation that investments 
are irreversible, so capital involves sunk costs (e.g. Abel and Eberly, 1994, 1997). 
This leaves the question why farmers invest in the first place. Do they not foresee that 
the reward for capital sooner or later will be lower than the buying price? Should they 
not decide not to invest or to invest less? To explain investment decisions, the 
literature focuses on the shadow price of capital, adjustment costs and uncertainty in a 
dynamic setting (Abel and Eberly, 1997; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Adjustment cost 
theory states that capital adjustment to changing market conditions is not 
instantaneous, may take a long time and involves significant adjustments costs (e.g., 
Lopez, 1985). More specifically, changes in capital stock are associated with 
increasing delivery cost of machinery, increasing administrative costs required to 
handle the new investment, engineering costs related to the planning of capital 
expansion, and more. However, adjustment cost theory is not very helpful in 
explaining low capital rewards. Adjustment costs increase the costs of investing and 
therefore lead to smaller investments and capital stock.  
The literature on uncertainty concentrates on uncertainty about prices, policies 
and technology movements (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Grenadier, 1997). These 
uncertainties lead to smaller investments, and therefore capital stock, if the 
expectation is that changes in price, policy and technology have a negative effect on 
profitability. Larger investments could come from expected improvements in 
profitability. For example, Alvarez et al (1998) show that the expectation of a future 
tax cut increases investment while a tax increase leads to smaller investments.   2
Uncertainties on policies and prices in the European Union (EU) are relatively low for 
sectors like dairy farming, given the EU-price support policy. However, uncertainty 
about the possibility of purchasing land can be rather large. Buying or renting land is 
often not possible for a specific farmer because she requires land close to her farm and 
the only possibility to buy or rent land is when her neighbor quits farming. Whether 
and when the neighbor will quit is unknown to her, but she has a priori expectations 
about the likelihood of these events. Uncertainty about the possibility of buying land 
is therefore in some cases (land intensive sectors) greater and more relevant than the 
uncertainty with respect to prices, policies and technology. 
Another theory on investment where uncertainty plays an important role is 
options theory (Dixit, 1992 and Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). This theory suggests that if 
we know that the information in the next period will be better than in the current one, 
it could be worthwhile to postpone the investment. Notice that waiting leads to under-
investment and higher factor rewards for capital in the current period. The lower 
profit in the current period could be compensated by the extra profit obtained in the 
next period due to better information. Crucial here are the assumptions that the 
information in the next period is better than the information today, that investment can 
be postponed and that investment involves sunk costs. The first two assumptions are 
often rather unrealistic. For example in the EU it is not clear if and when the dairy 
policy will be reformed and there is no reason to believe that next year the 
information will be better. Postponing investment is also not always possible, for 
example, because there is a limit to the time period a building license can be used, or 
the state of buildings requires immediate investing.  
The purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of uncertainty about the 
possibility of buying land on investment decisions. Moreover, we examine if 
uncertainty about the possibility of buying land can explain the perceived low capital 
rewards. Towards this aim, we develop and apply a simple two-period discrete-time 
investment model. With the model we analyze the effect of expectations of farmers 
about the possibility of buying extra land in the future (period 2) on investment in the 
current period (period 1). Moreover, we determine whether the model leads to higher 
investment and lower capital rewards, compared to the case where this possibility is 
ignored. Essential in our model is the assumption that farmers make investment 
decisions in period 1 ex-ante, prior to observing the realization of the possibility of 
acquiring additional land in period 2. However, we also investigate whether, and 
under what conditions, investment for an individual farm in period 2 is preferred to 
investment in period 1 (options theory). The model is applied for individual Dutch 
dairy farmers. 
This paper makes three contributions to the literature. First, it investigates the 
role of uncertainty about the possibility of buying land on investment decisions. 
Second, it examines whether the over-investment in agriculture often perceived can be 
explained by this uncertainty. Finally, it applies the developed model of investment to 
individual Dutch dairy farmers, and therefore takes into account the diversity among 
farmers. 
Section 2 derives analytically the optimal investment levels in period 1 under 
uncertainty about the possibility of purchasing land in period 2. Then it examines 
whether or not investment is higher under uncertainty about the possibility of buying 
land than under certainty. Next, it investigates whether postponing investment until 
period 2 is profitable or not and under what conditions. Section 3 discusses the 
empirical model. Using a static profit function, the shadow price equations for land 
and buildings are derived which are used to derive the optimal investment levels   3
under different assumptions about the probability of purchasing land and the period in 
which investment takes place (i.e., either period 1 or period 2).  The data and 
estimation of the empirical model are also discussed in this section. Section 4 then 
discusses the simulations and results. Finally, section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
 
2.  Two-period investment model 
 
This section presents a simple two-period investment model. Section 2.1 sets 
out some basic assumptions. Section 2.2 derives optimal investment under complete 
certainty about the possibility of purchasing land. Section 2.3 does this for the case of 
uncertainty. In section 2.4 it is shown whether and under what conditions there is a 
perceived bias towards either over-investment or under-investment. Finally, section 
2.5 determines optimal investment if investment takes place in period 2 instead of 
period 1. Moreover, it determines whether it is optimal to invest in period 1 or 2.  
 
2.1  Basic assumptions 
 
Consider a risk-neutral profit-maximizing farmer facing investment decisions 
at the beginning of period 1 and an uncertain opportunity to purchase land from a 
neighboring farm(s) in the future. For simplicity, we assume a time horizon of only 
two periods: present (ex ante), t=1 and future (ex post), t=2. The farm’s product at 
period 1 is given by  ) , ( 0
1 a K K f + , where  0 0 K >  is a predetermined level of initial 
capital stock,K represents the level of capital investment at the beginning of t=1 and a 
is the land endowment available for cultivation during this period. Obviously, output 
is also dependent on variable inputs, which are not explicitly included in the 
production function. Focusing on the relationships between land and capital, we 
assume that the level of these inputs, in each of the two periods, is optimally chosen 
for any given combination of land and capital and a given set of parameter values. 
The production function is assumed to be monotonically increasing, twice 


















Based on empirical evidence from Dutch dairy farms (see Section 3), we further 










  At the beginning of period 2, the farmer may have an opportunity to increase 
her land endowment if a neighbor will offer her farm-land for sale at the ongoing land 
market price of qdollars per hectare. If the farmer chooses to purchase land, b 
hectares will be traded, (assuming that  b    where , b b ≤ is the total amount of land 
offered for sale by the neighbor). Capital adjustment to changing market conditions is 
not instantaneous, may take a long time and involves significant adjustment costs 
(e.g., Lopez, 1985). We assume that adjustment costs are only present in period 1, 
since investment in the basic capital stock, K, is made at the beginning of this period. 
To maintain this stock level in the second period, the farmer covers the depreciation 
costs associated with K at the beginning of period 2. No adjustment costs are involved 
in maintaining a given stock level or in changing the level of use of variable inputs.  
   4
Thus, the production level in period 2 is given by ) , ( 0
2 b a K K f θ + + where θ  
is an indicator function which is equal to 1 if the opportunity to purchase land at the 
beginning of t=2 exists and is equal to 0 otherwise. Like 
2 1   , f f  is assumed to be 
monotonically increasing, twice differentiable and concave in both arguments and, as 












2.2  Certainty versus uncertainty 
 
Here we assume that in period 1 the farmer does not know with certainty 
whether she will be able to purchase land at the beginning of period 2.  Let  1   0 < <α  
be the perceived probability that the land will be available for sale at the beginning of 
t=2, i.e., the probability that  1 = θ . Since K0 is predetermined we will suppress it 
hereafter for notational convenience without loss of generality.  
 
Recall that θ  is known with certainty before the choice of b is made. Thus, if 
0 = θ than b=0 regardless the level of K which was determined ex-ante. If however, 
1 = θ  the ex-post optimization problem is to choose b that maximizes 
qb b a K f P − + ) , (
2 2 , where K is given and P
t is output price in the   period,  1,2
th tt = . 
The first order condition,  0 )] , (
2 2 = − + q b a K f P b , yields a derived demand for land, 














 The farmer's ex-ante optimization problem is to choose K that will maximize 
expected profits. Formally, 
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where r is the acquisition price of capital, ω  is the adjustment cost parameter, β  is 
the rate of depreciation of capital and  1 0 < <η  is the real discount rate. Focusing on 
the impacts of uncertainty about the possibility of purchasing land on investment 
decisions, we assume b to be strictly positive in the optimal solution. In other words, 
we focus our attention on farms for which the marginal value of the current land 
endowment (the shadow price of land), a, in the second period, exceeds (or does not 
fall short of) q.
1 For simplicity and without loss of generality we further assume that 
at the optimal solution  . bb <  It should be also noted that the optimization problem in 
(1) assumes away the option of disinvestment (i.e., K<0). This assumption is based on 
                                                           
1 Obviously, the option to sell land (0 ) b <  is potentially available for the farmer under consideration, 
but from her own point of view it is not subject to uncertainty.  
   5
the fixed asset theory (e.g., Johnson and Pasour, 1981) which emphasizes the 
divergence between the acquisition values (see Q below) and the salvage prices of 
“identical” units of fixed assets, with the latter price being lower than the former 
value. In the analysis below we assume that the shadow price of capital always 
exceeds its market salvage price (implying  0 K ≥ ).  
 
The first order condition is  
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where  ) 1 ( ηβ η ω + + + = r Q . 
Utilizing the first order condition for choosing b
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Optimal expected profits are thus given by 
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Assuming an internal solution, a comparative statics with (6) yields, 
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 Finally, note that (5a) can be used to calculate the expected loss from 
imperfect ex-ante information on land availability at period 2 which is given by 
** * * ** * ˆ ˆ (8)      EL( )=[ ( , ) (1 ) ( )] E ( , ). Kb K K b αα α
∧
Π+ − Π − Π  
   
 
Comparisons of capital investments under uncertainty and certainty conditions. 
 
For  1 = α  there is complete certainty about the possibility to buy land for  0 = α there 
is complete certainty that there is no possibility to buy land. Suppose optimal 
investment levels under both situations are 
* K and with 
* * K respectively. 
To compare K ˆ with 
* K and with 
* * K , define  
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and note from (6) that 












is positive for any  0 b >
)
 the first order condition in (6) can be 
satisfied only when 
1 ˆ () R K is negative. Noting that 
1
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 we can conclude that if 
** 0, K > and 
therefore 
1* * () 0 RK = , then 




1(0 ) RK = is 
negative and in that case ˆ() K α  may be also equal to zero, at least for some values of 
α at its lower range. The above findings allow us to conclude that 
** ()  0 1 . KK αα ≥∀ < ≤
)
 To compare 
* ( ) with  KK α
)
, let us first assume that the latter 
is strictly positive and calculate the first order condition in (6) at 
* KK = (and 
** () ) bb K = . Noting with complete certainty to buy land that 
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It can be easily verified that 
* ˆ 0 implies  ( ) 0, . KK α α == ∀  
 
The above analysis allow us to conclude  
 





** K  is strictly positive, than the inequalities in (9) become strict inequalities. 
 
  The result identified in (9) suggests that observers who inspect farms for 
which the option to acquire additional land was not realized may conclude that actual 
investment is too high  (
* * ˆ K K > ). On the other hand, observation of investment 
decisions made by farmers who actually purchased land at the second period may 
yield the conclusion that actual investment is too low (
* KK <
)
). Both observations 
may be correct ex-post, but neither of them demonstrate that, ex-ante, farmers make 
non-optimal and biased investment decisions.  
  
 




 is the optimal ex-ante capital investment at t=1. 
Nevertheless, it may appear too high or too low if observers evaluate investment 
decisions without reference to their timing and informational structure. If a 
representative farmer had perfect information, the optimization process would result 
in an average level of investment, say K , which is given by 
 
** * (10)      ( ) (1 ) . KK K αα α =+ −  
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  Observers unappreciative of the farmer's actual informational constraints may 
mistakenly identify a bias towards over-investment if  K K > ˆ and towards under-
investment if the inequality sign is reversed.  
 
To be more specific, assume first a farm for which 
** 0 K > , and therefore 
** * KK K <<
)
.  To compare   with  KK
)
 note that both, 
** * and  KK are independent 
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It is convenient now to utilize a graphical analysis. The function () K α is a 







is monotone increasing [monotone decreasing] inα  if 









then the curve  ( ) K α
)
is convex and, with the exception of its extreme point, lies below 
the curve  () K α , i.e.,  () () , ( 0 , 1 ) KK αα α <∀ ∈
)
, (see  ( )
II K α
)
in Figure 1a). Observers 
may (mistakenly) identify such a result as a bias towards under-investment. On the 
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)
is concave and, with the exception of its 






in Figure 1a). This result could certainly create a false impression of over-
investment.  
 
   In the above analysis we assumed a farm for which 
** 0. K >  For a farm which 
chooses not to invest in capital at all, even under certainty with  1, α =  i.e., a farm for 
which 
* 0 K = , we get 
** ˆˆ 0( ) ( ) 0 , . KK K K α αα == → = = ∀  Another potential 
situation is related to a farm for which 
** * 0 if  ˆ 0, 0 and  ( )








where α  is some (endogenously determined) threshold level of α . For the sake of 
illustration, such a situation is depicted in Figure 1b with the curves labeled 
() , ()  a n d   ()





2.4  Option Value, the option to invest in period 2 
 
Up to this point we have assumed that investment is made in period 1. In this 
section we examine the option to postpone investment to period 2. All decisions in 
period 2 are made ex post, after the value of θ  is realized. The farmer’s optimization 
problems for  0 and  1 θ θ == are given respectively by    8
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The optimal farm level profits with  0 and  1 θ θ = = are thus given respectively by 
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   Assuming internal solutions for the optimization problems in (12) and (13) we 
can compare
*   * * ~
 with 
~
K K . For this comparison it is useful to calculate the first order 
condition in (15a) at 
* * ~
K K = : 
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The inequality in (15a)' results from the assumption that capital and land are 
complementary inputs, (namely  0
2 > Ka f ), and allows us to conclude that 
* * * ~ ~
K K > .  
In other words, when the option to acquire land at period 2 is available, the farmer’s 
capital investment at period 2 is higher than the optimal investment when such an 
option does not exist. It is also interesting to compare optimal investments in periods 
1 and 2 under certainty. From derivations not shown here it can be concluded that if 
the shadow price of capital at period 1,  ,
1 1
K f P is relatively high, [relatively low], and 
purchase of additional land is not possible, than optimal investment in period 1 only, 
(
** K ), is higher [lower] than the optimal investment in period 2 only, (
** K % ). 
 
Similarly, comparison between 
*   *   and  
~
K K  (which are optimal for  1 θ = ) shows that 
if the shadow price of capital at period 1,  ,
1 1
K f P is relatively high, [relatively low], 
and purchase of additional land is possible, then optimal investment in period 1 only, 
(
* K ), is higher, [lower], than the optimal investment in period 2 only, (
* K % ). 
 
Optimal Timing for Capital Investment 
 
As mentioned above, option theory suggests that the certain information with 
respect to land availability in period 2, as compared to the uncertain information in 
period 1, may make it worthwhile postponing the investment to the second period. 
The choice of the optimal timing in the current analysis can be made via the following 
procedure. First, assume that investment is made at period 1 only and calculate the 
present value of expected profits  ) ˆ , ˆ ( E   b K
∧
Π , (see (5a)). Then, assume that investment 
is made only in the second period, and compute the present value of expected profits 
by (see (12a) and (13a)):    9
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~










, ( E       ) 18 (
* * * * * * * * * * *
  ~
K b K K b K Π − + Π = Π α α α  
 
At the beginning of period 1, the farmer has to decide whether to invest ex-ante  ˆ K  or, 
to wait for the second period and to invest ex-post either 
** *  (if  1) or   (if  0) . KK θθ == %%  The last stage of the procedure is to apply the 
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(19)     
ˆ ˆ If  E ( , ) E ( , , , )  then invest in period 2.
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The actual result of the comparisons in (19) depends on empirical specifications and 
data and is presented in Section 4. 
 
 
3. Empirical  model 
 
In this section we derive the shadow price equations for buildings and land of 
individual farms in a representative sample of Dutch dairy farming. These shadow 
price equations are used to derive optimal land demand and investment in buildings. 
The shadow price equations are derived from a micro-economic profit model. Micro 
economic profit models have been applied frequently in the agricultural economics 
literature (see Shumway, 1995, for an overview). This also holds for the dairy sector 
in the Netherlands (see Boots et al, 1997). Models of Dutch dairy farming have to take 
into account that dairy farms have operated under a quota constraint since 1984. 
 
  Dairy farming is modeled by assuming that the farm produces two outputs; 
milk (z0), which is subject to a supply constraint, and a composite of other outputs 
(e.g. beef) (q1). Two variable inputs are used; purchased feed (q2) and a composite of 
other inputs (q3). Furthermore, five quasi-fixed inputs are distinguished; labor (z1), 
land (z2), buildings (z3), machinery (z4) and dairy cattle (z5). The model also includes a 
time trend (z6) representing technology and a dummy (z7) allowing for a change in 
technology due to the introduction of milk quotas in 1984.  
 
The symmetric normalized quadratic (SNQ) form is used as the empirical 
specification (Kohli, 1993; Oude Lansink and Stefanou, 1997) of the restricted profit 
function. The SNQ is a flexible functional form that allows for negative profit and for 
curvature conditions (convexity in prices) to be imposed globally. Another advantage 
is that the estimation results do not depend on the choice of a numeraire netput (as is 
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The last term in the restricted profit function indicates that the quadratic term of the 
time dummy (z7) is not taken into account. Symmetry is maintained by requiring   10




lt lv w θ , 
where θl are non-negative constants determined as the average shares of netput l 




3 ,.., 1 0
j
j ij i v α  
have to be imposed, in order to identify all parameters αij. Here,vj is an arbitrary 
point of observation. 
 
  Netput equations (i=1,..,3) are derived using Hotelling’s lemma 
∑






































j l lj i
j
j ij i i
z z
z z z v v w v w q
β θ
β θ γ α θ α α
 
 
Shadow price equations (k=0,..,6) are derived taking the first order derivative 
of the profit function with respect to the quantities of fixed inputs: 









i ik k z w v s β γ     k=0,..,6   
 
Notice that shadow prices between farms depend only on differences in the level of 
quasi-fixed inputs.  
 
The milk supply function for the period before the introduction of milk quotas is 
derived by using the first order condition for profit maximization: 0 0 ) ( v z g = ⋅ − ∂ ∂ , 
with v0 being the price of milk. Solving for z0 yields:  
(23)   

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Data and Estimation 
 
Data on specialized dairy farms covering the period 1973/74-1992/93 come 
from a stratified sample of farms keeping accounts on behalf of the Dutch 
Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI) farm accounting system. The data set 
used for estimation contains 9365 observations on 1961 farms. In the sample (very) 
small farms and non-specialized farms are not represented. 
 
  Data on variable outputs and inputs are measured as revenues and costs. Other 
output is an aggregate of revenues from marketable crops, beef and veal, and other 
animals. Other variable inputs consist of feed for animals other than dairy cattle, 
seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, contract work, veterinary services, fuel, energy and costs 
of other cattle. Fixed inputs are labor (hours), land (hectares), buildings, machinery 
and costs of dairy cattle. Other variables in the empirical model are a trend and a 
dummy allowing for a change in technology due to the introduction of milk quotas in 
1984. 
   11
  Tornqvist price indices were calculated for the composite variables (other 
output, feed input and other variable input). Implicit quantity indices were obtained as 
the ratio of value and the price index. The price indices vary over the years, but not 
over the farms, implying that the differences in the composition of a netput, or quality 
differences, are reflected in the quantity.  
 
  The system of equations (21) and (23) is estimated with additive error terms 
included prior to estimation. Every farm is assumed to have a farm-specific intercept, 
reflecting differences in farm characteristics (e.g. management quality and soil 
quality). A fixed-effects model explicitly accounts for this assumption. The necessary 
transformation for such a model can also be applied to an incomplete panel, like our 
data set. The profit function is not estimated along with the netput equations, since the 
intercepts of the netput equations appear as slope coefficients in the profit function. 
Including the profit function during estimation requires direct estimation of all farm-
specific intercepts. Note that all parameters of the profit function are, however, 
identified in the netput equations. 
  
The milk supply equation (23) is included during estimation in the period 
before the quota introduction, causing a difference in the number of observations 
across equations. In the pre-quota period, the quantity of milk can be related to the 
error term and an instrumental variable estimator must be applied. Endogenous 
variables are z0, qi (i=1,..,3), and all terms containing milk output (e.g. z0z0, z0zk). All 
exogenous variables are used as instruments. Error terms may be correlated across 
equations. Therefore, the estimation technique used is non-linear 3SLS (Judge et al., 
1998, p.655). The covariance matrix of residuals used in estimating the system is 
corrected for the difference in the number of observations (Judge et al., 1988, p.462). 
 
  The estimation results that can be obtained from the authors show that about 
half of the parameters are significant at the critical 5 per cent level. Moreover, 
estimation results show that land and buildings (but also milk quota and machinery) 
are complements, as was assumed in the theoretical analysis presented in Section 2. 
 
 
4.  Simulations and results 
 
From the estimated model the shadow price equations are derived for the quasi-fixed 
inputs (22). In the simulations
2 all netput prices and quasi-fixed inputs are kept equal 
to the level of 1992/93. The only exceptions are land and buildings; the optimal level 
of these inputs is determined using assumptions about the probabilities of the 
possibility of buying land in period 2 (see Section 2).  
 
Simulation I  Perceived biases toward non-optimal investment decisions 
In the first group of simulations we assume that investment in buildings takes 
place in period 1 and that there is a probability of buying land in period 2. Because we 
                                                           
2  Note that we simulate optimal investment decisions and thus do not test if the theoretical model can 
predict actual past behavior. There are a few reasons for this. First, farm-level data on land prices, 
probabilities, adjustment costs, discount and depreciation rates are not available for the sample. 
Second, we have an unbalanced data panel, so that farms stay in the sample for a limited number of 
years only, making it very complicated to follow their actual individual investment decisions. Finally, 
the   paper is focused on the potential (rather than actual) effects of uncertainty regarding the 
possibility of acquiring land on the investment in buildings.     12
do not know the actual probabilities we simulate over a range of probabilities (α  = 0; 
0.25; 0.50; 0.75 and 1). The simulations consist of two mutually dependent steps. 
First, the shadow price of land for an individual farm in period 2 is set equal to the 
price of land (q) and the optimal land demand is calculated as a function of the 
investment level, K (see Section 2.2). We assume the price of land to be equal to the 
average shadow price in 1992/93. In a perfect competitive land market it can be 
shown that the average shadow price would indeed equal the land price. This implies 
that if initially the shadow price is lower than the average shadow price the farm 
wants to sell land. If the shadow price is higher it wants to buy land. Focusing on the 
impacts of uncertainty about the possibility of buying land on capital investment, 
farms that want to sell land are excluded from the analysis (see section 2.2). In the 
second step, the optimal investment in buildings in period 1, in combination with land 
demand in period 2, is determined. This is done by equating the shadow price of 
buildings to an exogenously set value, Q = ) 1 ( ηβ η ω + + + r  (see (6), Section 2.2).   
 
If the initial shadow price of buildings is higher than Q then the farm wants to 
invest. If the initial shadow price of buildings is lower than Q, and lower than the 
salvage value, then the farm wants to disinvest. If it is lower than Q but higher than 
the salvage value then the farm wants to keep the capital stock constant (the fixed 
asset theory). However, in the current analysis we do not consider disinvestment and 
therefore we keep the stock of buildings constant in the simulations. We assume r, the 
acquisition price of capital, to be equal to the 1992/93 interest rate, which was equal 
to 5%. The adjustment cost parameter ω  is assumed to be equal to 1% (see 
Gardebroek and Oude Lansink (2001) for an estimate of this parameter). The real 
discount rate η equals 1/(1+r). So we assume the opportunity costs of capital for the 
farm to be equal to the interest rate. In reality this depends on alternative investment 
projects and expectations of the individual farmer. Finally, we assumeβ  the rate of 
depreciation, to be equal to 4%. This is in line with assumptions made by the Dutch 
Agricultural Economics Research Institute. These assumptions lead to a Q equal to 
11%. The two steps in the simulations are mutually dependent. So, higher investment 
in buildings increases the demand for land and vice versa.  
 
After the optimal investment levels in combination with land demand under 
uncertainty are derived we examine whether the result in (9) holds, i.e. that 
uncertainty about the probability of buying land ( ) 1 0 < <α  leads to higher 
investment as compared to a situation where the option to acquire land is ignored or 
not available ( 0 = α ). Next, we determine whether there is perceived under-
investment or over-investment. This is done by comparing the actual, ex-ante, optimal 
investment level under uncertainty ( ) ( ˆ α K ) with the perceived optimal investment 
(see ) (α
−
K in (10)), the weighted average of the optimal investment levels under 
certainty.  If the actual optimal investment level is lower than the perceived optimal 
investment there is a false impression that we have under-investment. If it is higher 
we have the false impression of over-investment (see Section 2.4). 
Simulation II  Investing in period 1 or 2? 
The second group of simulations consists of two separate steps. First, 
assuming that both investment and buying land take place in period 2, optimal 
investment, land demand and profits are determined. Because in period 2 there is 
certainty about the possibility of buying land this is done only for the probabilities   13
0   and   1 = = α α  (land demand can be either realized or not). The shadow price of land 
is again set equal to the average shadow price of land in 1992/93 (‘the land price’) to 
determine whether or not to buy land when  1 = α .  The shadow price of buildings is 
set equal to  ω + = r Q1  (see (14) and (15a)) which equals 6%. Second, the optimal 
timing for investment is determined using (19). Specifically, if the weighted average 
of the profit under certainty about the possibility of buying land or not in the case of 
investing in period 2 (18), is higher (lower) than expected profit under uncertainty, in 
case of investing in period 1 (5a), then investing in period 2 (period 1) is optimal 




Simulation I  Perceived biases toward non-optimal investment decisions 
In this simulation it is assumed that farms invest in buildings in period 1. First 
the farms buying land are identified and then, under different probabilities of buying 
land, the optimal level of investment is determined. Finally, it is examined whether 
there is perceived over-investment or not. 
 
Table1 presents the number of farms in the sample buying land and their 
investment decisions (investing or keeping the stock of buildings constant). The 
percentage changes in profits are relative to the present value of profits (in both 
periods) in the absence of capital investment and land acquisition (i.e., K=b=0). The 
percentage changes in capital (buildings) and land endowment are relative to their 
respective levels in the base year 1992/93.   
 
Table 1: Number of farms in the sample buying land in period 2 and investing or not 
investing in period 1, percentage change ( % ∆ ) in profits, capital (buildings) and land 
endowment. 
\Probability α   0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
Farms buying land  213
1  213 213 213 213
Farms buying land and not investing  167 166 163 161  157
% ∆  profit  0 0.29 0.56 0.83 1.01
% ∆  land
3  0 42.18 41.96 41.74 40.23
Farms buying land and investing  46 47 50 52  56
% ∆  profit  3.08 3.43 3.73 4.18 4.85
% ∆  land
3  - 31.27 35.11 38.95 46.95
% ∆  capital  95.10 102.11 106.44 114.64 121.03
% ∆  optimal capital
2   - 104.58 110.53 118.20 -
1:  Farms would buy land if they could. 
2:  Percentage change in capital in case the capital amount equals the weighted 
average of capital under certainty (α = 0 and α = 1), using the probabilities as weight 
( () K α in (10)). 
3:  Optimal land demand given the investment made under uncertainty. 
 
Table 1 shows that of the 409 farms in the sample 213 would like to buy land 
(52.0%). From these 213 farms, 56 would like to invest in buildings in addition to 
buying land (26.3%). The finding that additional investment is not optimal for a large 
number of farms may, among other things, be the result of an ex-ante high investment   14
made prior to the base year 1992/1993, where the (uncertain) option of buying or 
renting land was not realized.  The relatively large increase in land indicates that 
many dairy farms are very much constrained by the amount of land. Moreover, since 
land and buildings are complements, investment in buildings leads to a higher land 
demand. Table 1 shows also that with an increase in the probability of the possibility 
of buying land a larger number of farms want to invest and the average amount of 
land demanded and investment in buildings increases. This is caused by the larger 
(expected) land demand in combination with the fact that buildings and land are 
complements. These results also hold for each individual farm and confirm the 
findings in (7) and (9). So, taking the probability of buying land into account leads to 
an increase in investment. Moreover, Table 1 shows that expected profits increase 
with the increase in the probability of buying land. So it can be concluded that a 
higher probability of the possibility of buying land leads to more farms investing, 
higher investment in buildings and larger farm-level profits.   
 
 Next, we have examined the role of the informational structure on land 
availability in explaining the impression of many observers that farmers' decisions are 
non-optimal. For this purpose, optimal investment levels under uncertainty, given a 
specific probability level (see ˆ() K α in (6)), should be compared with the weighted 
average of the optimal investments with probabilities  1   and   0 = = α α  using the 
probability as a weight (see  () K α in (10)). Comparing the lines 
"   capital   optimal   % "    and   capital"   % " ∆ ∆  of Table 1, relating to farms which buy land 
and invest, shows that the optimal investment level under uncertainty,  ˆ() K α , is lower 
than the weighted average investment level,  () K α , for all probabilities strictly larger 
than 0 and smaller than 1 (see  ) (α
II K in Figure 1a). This result also holds for each 
one of the individual farms. For farms that do not invest at low probability levels but 
do at higher probability levels the optimal investment level is also lower than the 
weighted average investment level (see Figure 1b) at a specific probability. So, if 
there is a positive probability of buying land, farms invest more than they would when 
0 = α . However, if farms actually buy land in period 2 there is the false impression 
that investments made in period 1 are too low.  
 
Using (8) the extra expected profit the average farm would have in the case of 
full information is also calculated, where the full information case is the weighted 
profit at probabilities 0 and 1 using the probabilities  ) 1 (   and   α α − as weights. This 
extra profit would be the maximum price the farmer is willing to pay for full 
information. The expected extra profits under the probabilities (α ) 0.25, 0.5, and 0.75 




Simulation II Investing in period 1 or 2? 
In the second simulation investment is made in period 2. The results are 
presented in Table 2 which shows the number of farms buying land, their decisions 
with respect to investing in buildings, and the percentage change, compared to 
1992/93, in capital, land and profit (discounted over periods 1 and 2). It also shows 
the number of farms for which investing in period 2 is more attractive than investing 
                                                           
3 1USD = 1.10 EUR    15
in period 1. These numbers are determined using (19) in which the profit associated 
with investing under uncertainty in period 1 is compared to the profit obtained when 
investment is made ex-post, in period 2.  
 
Table 2: Number of farms in the sample buying land in period 2 and investing or not 
investing in period 2, percentage change ( % ∆ ) in profits, capital (buildings) and land 
endowment. 
\Probability α   0 1 
Farms buying land  210 210 
    
Farms buying land and not investing  169  143 
% ∆ Profit  0 0.95 
% ∆ Land  0 39.60 
    
Farms buying land and investing  41  67 
% ∆ Profit  1.48 4.09 
% ∆ Land  - 70.56 
% ∆ Capital  90.97 180.93 
    
Number of farms for which investing in period 2 is more 









Comparison of Tables 1 and 2 shows that in the case where  1 = α  slightly 
fewer farms would buy land in period 2 if investment decisions are made in period 2 
instead of period 1 (210 instead of 213).  However, more farms invest in buildings (67 
instead of 56). The average farm investing in period 2 buys more land and invests 
more in buildings, as compared to the average farm investing in period 1, but profits 
increase less. Moreover, investment and land demand are higher for 64 out of 67 
farms and for three farms investment and land demand are smaller. These results can 
be explained by the fact that the shadow price of buildings in period 1 is relatively 
low (see (17)) when the purchase of land is possible.  
 
Next we compare profit levels for individual farms purchasing land, in the 
case investments are made in period 2, to the profit levels of the same farms when 
investment in period 1 takes place under uncertainty. Table 2 shows that for most 
farms profit is higher when investment takes place in period 1 under uncertainty 
(α =0.25, 0.5 or 0.75) compared to profits in the case of investing in period 2 (see 
(19)). Comparing the profit levels for the average farm investing in Tables 1 and 2 can 
be misleading because it does not refer to exactly the same farms. These results 
clearly indicate that for most farms investing in period 1 under uncertainty is 
preferable to investing in period 2 under certainty about the possibility of buying land.  
 
 
5.  Summary and Concluding Remarks 
 
Uncertainty about the possibility of acquiring land can be rather large in the 
EU for sectors like dairy farming. Farm-level investment decisions are commonly   16
made ex-ante when the farmer is not certain about the possibility of purchasing land. 
This possibility is realized only in a future period. In this paper, we have developed 
and applied a simple two-period model in which a profit-maximizing farmer, facing 
uncertainty about the possibility of acquiring land, had to choose the optimal mix of 
capital (buildings) investment and land endowment. We have shown that commonly 
"observed" biases towards non-optimal investment decisions are not necessarily 
justified. Rather, these perceived biases may be the result of evaluating investment 
decisions without reference to the uncertainty associated with the possibility of 
acquiring land.  
 
 Observers who inspect farms for which the option of acquiring additional land 
was actually realized (not realized) in the “future period” (period 2) may conclude that 
actual investment made in the previous period (period 1) is too low (too high). These 
observations may be correct ex-post, but they do not necessarily demonstrate that, ex-
ante, farmers make non-optimal or biased investment decisions. Empirical analysis of 
Dutch dairy farms shows that the optimal (ex-ante) level of investment in buildings 
under uncertainty is lower than the weighted average of optimal investments made 
under the assumption of perfect information.  
 
Another important implication of the model is that potentially, farm-level 
capital investment in period 1 and the subsequent level of land purchased (when 
available) in period 2, may be strongly affected by the farmer's perception of the 
likelihood of land availability. Indeed, the empirical results show that with an increase 
in the perceived probability of purchasing land, a larger number of farmers choose to 
invest and both the amount of land demanded and the investment in buildings increase 
on each individual farm.  
 
A working hypothesis of our analysis is that investment decisions must be 
made ex-ante (at period 1) when the farmer is not certain regarding the possibility of 
buying land. However, as suggested by the option theory, it might be beneficial to 
postpone investment until the second period when information regarding land 
availability becomes certain. We investigate whether postponing investment until 
period 2 is profitable or not and under what conditions. The empirical analysis clearly 
demonstrates that for the vast majority of Dutch dairy farms analyzed, ex-ante 
investment in period 1 is preferable to ex-post investment in period 2.  
 
The results of our study are obviously subject to some qualifications. Land 
availability is assumed here as the only source of uncertainty that affects investment 
decisions. Inclusion of additional uncertainties with respect to prices, public policies 
and/or technology is another direction into which the analysis can be profitably 
extended. The two-period model is specialized, mathematically tractable and captures 
the major characteristics of the problem analyzed. However, it cannot fully capture 
the actual dynamics of investment decisions, the timing of varying parameters and 
continuous changes in capital stocks. Using a more complicate, multi-period or 
continuous stochastic dynamic optimization model may also benefit the analysis. The 
model presented here can serve as a building block in this type of extended analyses. 
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